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Gault: Statutory Grandchild Visitation.

STATUTORY GRANDCHILD VISITATION
DUNCAN GAULT*
In normal family relations one of the great joys a grandchild experiences is visitation with his doting and proud grandparent, who bestows
upon him all manner of love and affection. Unfortunately there are
instances where normal family relations do not exist. There may be
bitter and irreconcilable differences between a parent and a grandparent, with or without the fault of one or both parties, to the extent that
the custodial parent refuses to permit the grandparent to visit his minor
grandchild.
Courts in Texas and other jurisdictions of the United States have
held that the obligation of the custodial parent to permit visitation of
the grandchild by the grandparent is moral, not legal;' that the custodial parent does not have to account to anyone for his motives in
denying visitation;' and that the courts will not enforce any so called
"right" of visitation by the grandparent with the grandchild over the
protests of the custodial parent.3
NEW PROVISIONS OF TEXAs FAMILY CODE

Title 2 of the Texas Family Code, effective on January 1, 1974,
purports to make a radical change in the present Texas case law. The
Family Code appears to create a right of visitation with the grandchild
in favor of the grandparent, notwithstanding the protest of the custodial
parent; granting to the court the power to issue necessary orders to
enforce such right, and providing the grandparent the right of trial
by jury on the grandchild visitation issue, with the court being bound
by the jury verdict. The following sections of the new Family Code
are those in which these changes are found:
Sec. 14.03. Possession of and Access to Child
* Attorney at Law, Mineral Wells, Texas; B.S., U.S. Military Academy; J.D.,
St, Mary's University.
1. E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. McDonald v. Smith, 85 A.2d 686, 688 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1952); Smith v. Painter, 408 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1966),
writ ref'd n.r.e., 412 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Sup. 1967) (per curiam).
2. E.g., Odell v. Lutz, 177 P.2d 628, 629 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947); Succession
of Reiss, 15 So. 151, 152 (La. 1894).
3. E.g., Odell v. Lutz, 177 P.2d 628, 629 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947); Succession
of Reiss, 15 So. 151, 152 (La. 1894).
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(d) The court may grant reasonable visitation rights to either
the maternal or paternal grandparents of the child and issue any
necessary orders to enforce said decree.
Sec. 11.13. Jury
(a) In a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, except a
suit in which adoption is sought, any party may demand a jury
trial.
(b) The verdict of the jury is binding on the court except with
respect to the issues of managing conservatorship, possession, and
support of and access to a child, on which the verdict is advisory
only, provided, however, the court may not enter a decree that
contravenes the verdict of the jury on the issues of managing conservatorship, possession of, or access to a child.
The State Bar of Texas sponsored the Family Code and other significant legislation adopted at the last session of the legislature. Great
credit is due the various members of the State Bar who have given
so generously of their time and efforts in this legislative reform program designed to better permit our Texas courts to cope with the myriad problems of a growing and dynamic state. The comments in this
article are not intended in any way to detract from the favorable recognition owed to the drafters of the Family Code. Instead, this article
is directed to the question of whether or not this purported change
in the law of grandparent-grandchild visitation has merit.
PRESENT TEXAS CASE LAW

There seem to be only two Texas cases in point: Smith v. Painter4
and Green v. Green.' The Eastland Court of Civil Appeals decided
both of these recent cases, and in each case the application for writ of
error to the Supreme Court of Texas was refused due to a finding
of no reversible error.
Smith was a case of first impression in the State of Texas. The
court of civil appeals held in that case that a natural father and adoptive mother were entitled as a matter of law to refuse to permit the
maternal grandfather to communicate and visit with their 5-year-old
son at reasonable times and places. 6
The same principle of law was adhered to in Green wherein a surviving mother, vested with custody of her 6-year-old daughter, was allowed as a matter of law to refuse to permit her child to visit with
4. 408 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1966), writ ref'd n.r.e., 412 S.W.2d
28 (Tex. Sup. 1967) (per curiam).

5. 485 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastand 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
6. Smith v. Painter, 408 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1966), writ
ref'd n.r.e., 412 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Sup. 1967).
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the paternal grandparents, notwithstanding the fact that the jury found
that such visitation with the paternal
grandparents would be in the best
7
child.
the
of
welfare
interest and
Both opinions are relatively short. Wisely, and out of deference to
the parties and the welfare of the minor child, the opinions do not state
the various charges and countercharges made as between parent and
grandparent. Nor do the opinions reflect the voluminous transcripts
and records which were before the court in each instance. An inspection of the records in each case discloses the hostile atmosphere and
irreconcilable differences existing between parent and grandparent.
Neither Smith nor Green was decided on a factual basis. Each case
was decided on the legal issue presented; whether a grandparent has
a legal right to visitation privileges with his minor grandchild over the
objections of the parent or parents having custody.8 Smith and Green
both hold that no such right exists in favor of the grandparent.
SMITH V. PAINTER

In Smith the natural mother of the child had died, and the father
had remarried. The maternal grandfather filed suit against the father
and the adoptive mother seeking to obtain visitation privileges.
The father and adoptive mother filed their motion for summary
judgment and an affidavit wherein they claimed that visitation by the
grandfather with the minor child created grave disciplinary problems
with the child. The grandfather countered with his controverting affidavit wherein he specifically denied under oath the allegations that he
had caused any disciplinary problems with the child. The grandfather
also filed an affidavit from an uncle, by marriage to the child's natural
mother, stating that the best interest of the child required visitations
with his grandfather.'
The grandfather appealed from the order of the trial court granting
the father's and adoptive mother's motion for summary judgment. The
court of civil appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court and noted
in its opinion that the court could not find any Texas cases in point
7. Green v. Green, 485 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
8. Green v. Green, 485 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Smith v. Painter, 408 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1966), writ
ref'd n.r.e., 412 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Sup. 1967).

9. Record at 17-28, Smith v. Painter, 408 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland

1966), writ rcl'd n.r.e., 412 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Sup. 1972).
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and that none were cited by counsel.'
The court then cited an 1894
decision by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, Succession of Reiss,"
12
stating that it considered the case to be sound in principle.
Reiss is generally considered to be a case of first impression in
American Jursprudence."1 It is a landmark case and frequently cited.
A detailed analysis of this case is helpful in understanding the case
law that developed in the area of grandparent visitation rights. In
Reiss the maternal grandmother sued the father of two minor children,
6 and 8 years of age, to compel the father to send his children, whose
mother had been dead about 6 years, to visit her at her residence on
such days and at such hours as might be fixed by the court. The
trial court entered its order requiring the father to send the children
to visit with their grandmother and also ordered that the grandmother
should visit with the children at their father's home. The father had
not sent the children to the grandmother for more than 3 years, and
the grandmother had not visited with the children in their father's
home. On appeal the grandmother sought a revision of the orders
of the trial court to delete any requirement that she visit with the children in their father's home and that the order, as modified, require
only that the father send the children to visit with her.
The grandmother alleged that the father was arbitrarily, wantonly,
maliciously, and cruelly denying her the privilege of seeing her grandchildren. The father denied that he had refused visitation privileges
to the grandmother and admitted that there was a law of nature that
children should visit their grandparents. The grandmother admitted
that she had never visited the children at their father's home, saying
simply that it was proper to send the children to her, that she did not
think it was her place to see the children at their father's home, and
that the children should come to see her. The father, the paternal
grandfather, the children, and other members of the father's family all
lived at the same residence. On the surface the sole difference between
the grandmother and the father on the issue of grandchild visitation was
the place of visitation; the grandmother demanding that the children
be sent to visit her, rather than visit the children at their father's home.
10. Smith v. Painter, 408 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1966), writ ref'd
n.r.e., 412 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. 1972).
11. 15 So. 151 (La. 1894).

12. Smith v. Painter, 408 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1966),
writ ref'd n.r.e., 412 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Sup. 1972).

13. Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 325, 327 (1964).
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The court noted, however, that the relations between the grandmother
and the members of the father's family were not "of the most pleasant
character" and further stated: "Ill feeling and bad blood separate the
father and grandmother."1' 4
The court noted that "[t]he question involved is res nova in this
state" and sought commentaries and court decisions interpreting the
articles of the Civil Code of France.' 5 The court stated that the
French authorities were divided on this issue and that there was "respectable authority" holding that the precept of Deuteronomy, "Honora
patrem tuum et matrem," also included "the grandfather and the
grandmother and that a court can intervene for its enforcement without
regard to the will of the father or mother."' 6 Other French authorities,
however, had held "that under the law of nature the child is under
the authority of the father or mother after the death of either." 7
The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed all orders of the trial
court, refused to intervene for the grandmother, and dismissed the suit.
The court quoted from Laurent as follows:
We translate from 4 Laurent, p. 362, who propounds the question, can the ascendant demand that the authority of the father
and mother be limited? In truth, the ascendants have certain
rights that the law, in accord with nature, gives them; but only
when the father and mother are dead, or are incapable of manifesting their will. During the existence of the father and mother,
the law properly accords them no authority over the children. To
permit them to intervene would occasion embarrassment and annoyance; even more, it would injuriously hinder proper paternal
authority by dividing it. The authority sought is said to be in the
interest of the children. Are the children interested in anything in
the nature of a conflict of authority? Without doubt it is desirable that the ties of affection that nature creates between the ascendants and their granchildren be strengthened and unceasing,
but, if there is a conflict, the father alone or the mother should be
the judge. The law gives no right of action to the grandparents.
The father may have good reasons to avoid all contact between his
children and their grandparents-either that he fears that they may
inculcate bad principles, or that they will unsettle the respect and
affection due him. He owes no account to any one for his motives. They may be so intimate that the honor of the family requires that they shall remain a secret. Shall we say that the judge
14. Succession of Reiss, 15 So. 151, 152 (La. 1894).
15. Id. at 152.

16. Id. at 152.
17. Id. at 152.
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shall be the arbitrator between the grandparent and the father?
The court of Bordeaux replies that the intervention of the tribunals would, as a consequence, render the dissensions of the family
more pronounced by delivering them to the public. 8
The court in Reiss went on to comment that:
We refer approvingly to the French authorities only so far as they
lay down the principles that there is not a vinculum juris; that the
obligation ordinarily to visit grandparents is moral, and not legal.
There may be cases of downright wrong and inhumanity demanding judicial intervention, even to the extent of dismissing the
father and tutor from his trust. The case at bar does not disclose
so grave an issue. Ill feeling and bad blood separate the father
and grandmother. 9
The Supreme Court of Texas in its opinion, refusing a writ of error in Smith v. Painter,20 observed that the adoptive mother of the
minor child had all the rights of a natural mother to refuse visitation
of the minor child by the grandfather but did not then pass on the
21
matter of whether or not Reiss accurately reflected the law of Texas.
GREEN

v.

GREEN

In Green, the paternal grandparents sued the mother and the maternal grandparents for child custody and in the alternative for visitation
with the minor grandchild who had been in the custody of her mother
since the death of the child's father. In answer to special issues, the
jury found that it would not be in the best interest and welfare of the
child for her custody to be removed from her mother. The jury did
find, however, that it would be in the best interest and welfare of the
child for the paternal grandparents to have reasonable visitation
privileges. Upon motion of the mother, the trial court disregarded the
special issue on visitation privileges in favor of the paternal grandparents and the answer of the jury thereto, and granted judgment in favor
of the mother as to custody, rendering judgment that the paternal
grandparents take nothing. The grandparents limited their appeal to
the denial of visitation privileges.
The court of civil appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court
and in a very brief opinion, denying any visitation privileges to the
18. Id. at 152.

19. Id. at 152.
20. 412 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Sup. 1967).
21. Id.
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paternal grandparents, announced its reliance upon the principles ap22
plied in Smith.
CASE LAW OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS

The courts have been virtually unanimous in denying a grandparent
visitation privileges with a grandchild when the custodial parent objects.
This has been true not only in Texas, but in other jurisdictions as well:
Arkansas, 23 California, 24 District of Columbia,25 Louisiana, 26 New
29
York, 27 Ohio, 2s and Pennsylvania.
It is interesting to note that all of the decisions in the various jurisdictions have treated the issue as a question of law and not upon any
factual determination, such as whether the grandparent is a fit person.
Several decisions have even recognized the grandparent as a fit person
and still decided the visitation issue as a matter of law, denying the
grandparent visitation rights.3 0 In most of the cases, the courts have
noted that the hostile relations and irreconcilable differences existing
between the parent and grandparent created an atmosphere that was
deemed contrary to the best interests and welfare of the child. 3 '
In reviewing the cases from the various jurisdictions, there appear
to be five basic reasons relied upon for the denial of judicially enforced
grandparent visitation rights, which may be summarized as follows:
(1) Ordinarily the parent's obligation3 2 to allow the grandparent
to visit the child is moral, and not legal.
(2) The judicial enforcement of grandparent visitation rights
would divide proper parental authority thereby hindering it.33
22. Green v. Green, 485 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).

23. Veazy v. Stewart, 472 S.W.2d 102 (Ark. 1971).

24. Odell v. Lutz, 177 P.2d 628 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
25. Jackson v. Fitzgerald, 185 A.2d 724 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1962).
26. Succession of Reiss, 15 So. 151 (La. 1894).

27. People ex rel. Sisson v. Sisson, 2 N.E.2d 660 (N.Y. 1936); Noll v. Noll,
98 N.Y.S.2d 938 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
28, Kay v. Kay, 112 N.E.2d 562 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Cuyahoga Co., 1953).
29. Commonwealth ex rel. McDonald v. Smith, 85 A.2d 686 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1952);
Commonwealth ex rel. Flannery v. Sharp, 30 A.2d 810 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1943).
30. E.g., Odell v. Lutz, 177 P.2d 628 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947); Commonwealth
ex rel. Flannery v. Sharp, 30 A.2d 810 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1943).
31. E.g., Succession of Reiss, 15 So. 151, 152 (La. 1894); Commonwealth ex rel.
McDonald v, Smith, 85 A.2d 686, 687 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1952).
32. E.g., Succession of Reiss, 15 So. 151, 152 (La. 1894); Smith v. Painter,
408 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1966), writ ref'd n.r.e., 412 S.W.2d 28
(Tex.Sup. 1967).
33. E.g., Odell v. Lutz, 177 P.2d 628, 629 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947); Jackson v.
Fitzgerald, 185 A.2d 724, 726 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1962).
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(3) The best interests of the child are not furthered by forcing
the child into the midst of a conflict of authority and ill feelings
between the parent and grandparent.3 4
(4) Where there is a conflict as between grandparent and parent,
the parent alone should be the judge, without having to account to
anyone for the motives in denying the grandparent visitation. 5
(5) The ties of nature are the only efficacious means of restoring
normal family relations and not the coercive measures which follow judicial intervention. 6
EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE

The general rule that a grandparent does not have any legal right
to visitation privileges with the grandchild over the objection of the
custodial parent is subject to an exception. Visitation privileges in favor of a grandparent may be upheld in the event of a subsequent attack when such privileges were awarded to the grandparent incident
to a divorce proceeding wherein the parents consented or acquiesced
to such rights. An additional element in this exception is a finding
that ties of love and affection have developed between the child and
the grandparent. 7 The same *result may follow even in the absence
of a prior award of visitation privileges to the grandparent when the
have resided with the grandparent,
custodial parent and the grandchild
3
dies.
then
parent
and the custodial
By way of illustration of this exception to the general rule, in Benner
v. Benner39 the wife, who had been awarded custody of the minor
child, resided with her mother. Subsequently, the wife disappeared
and the father was awarded custody of the child at which time he stipulated that the maternal grandmother would have visitation privileges
with the child. The father remarried and thereafter attacked the order
granting visitation. The appellate court, in upholding the visitation
order, noted that the father had consented to the order of visitation
and that such visitations with the maternal grandmother were in the
best interest of the child in that the child had lived with the grand34. E.g., Noll v. Noll, 98 N.Y.S.2d 938, 940 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Commonwealth
ex rel. Flannery v. Sharp, 30 A.2d 810, 812 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1943).
35. E.g., Odell v. Lutz, 177 P.2d 628, 629 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947); Succession

of Reiss, 15 So. 151, 152 (La. 1894).
36. E.g., Succession of Reiss, 15 So. 151, 152 (La. 1894); Commonwealth ex rel.

Flannery v. Sharp, 30 A.2d 810, 812 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1943).
37. See Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 325, 328-29 (1964).
38. Id. at 328-29.
39. 248 P.2d 425 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
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mother about 3 years.4
In allowing the grandparent visitation rights
the court was of the opinion that the child would sustain considerable
nervous and emotional disturbance if she were completely removed
from the familiar surroundings. 4
It should be noted that a court order granting visitation to the grandparent, in accordance with the stipulation of the custodial parent, is
not always an absolute bar to a subsequent modification of the order
whereby further grandparent-grandchild visitations are denied. In
People ex rel. Marks v. Grenier,41 there was a stipulation for grandparent-grandchild visitation by the father, which was later successfully attacked by the father and vacated.4" In Commonwealth ex rel. McDonald v. Smith 44 the father complied with a trial court order for grandparent-grandchild visitation during a period of approximately 16
months before filing a petition which successfully revoked the order
granting visitation privileges to the grandparents."
Woods v. Parkerson41 was a 1967 case decided by the Supreme
Court of Colorado in which there was a divorce action pending when
the wife died. Upon motion of the parents of the deceased wife, they
were substituted as parties defendant in the divorce action. On stipulation of the parties, the grandparents and natural father agreed that he
was to have custody of the two minor children and that the grandparents were to have certain visitation rights, the court entering an order accordingly. Thereafter the father refused to permit the grandparents to visit with the children and was cited for contempt. The father
countered by filing a motion wherein he asked that the grandparents'
right of visitation be terminated. The Supreme Court of Colorado held
that the trial court had acted without jurisdiction to enter any order
as to the grandparents concerning custody or right of visitation and
directed that the trial court vacate its previous orders.47
IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW STATUTES

As the discussion thus far has shown, the sections of the Family
40. Id. at 426.
41. Id. at 426; accord, Kentura v. Kentura, 152 P.2d 238 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1944).
42. 293 N.Y.S. 364 (Sup. CL), a! 'd, 10 N.E.2d 577 (N.Y. 1937).

43. Id. at 365.

44. 85 A.2d 686 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1952).

45. Id. at 687-88.
46. 430 P.2d 467 (Colo. 1967).

47. Id. at 469.
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Code quoted earlier contravene well settled case law by conferring
upon a grandparent the right of visitation with his minor grandchild
notwithstanding the protests of a fit custodial parent. Apparently the
drafters of the sections under discussion consider the statutory grant
of such visitation rights to a grandparent as constitutional and valid.
There is a suggestion in Odell v. Lutz4" that the granting of any such
visitation rights to the grandparent under these conditions would be
an interference with the natural liberty of a parent to control the
rearing of his child, an encroachment on the personal liberty of
the parent, and an act forbidden by the Constitution.4 9 It will be
interesting to see what action the courts take in response to a constitutional attack on the new statutory grant of visitation rights to a grandparent.
These new sections of the Family Code introduce several other new,
related concepts. In addition to giving the courts the power to enter
necessary orders to enforce visitation fights in favor of the grandparent,
there have been enacted provisions which would give the grandparent
the right of jury trial on the issue of visitation fights, and would make
the verdict of the jury binding on the court.
Any right to a jury trial on the issue of grandchild visitation is indeed a new concept. Article 4639a 5° has in the past provided for
jury trials in any hearing "concerning the custody of a child, whether
pursuant to a divorce cause or not . . . ." Article 4639a is silent,
however, as to the question of visitation. This article, as amended in
1961, required that the judgment of the court conform to the jury verdict concerning the issue of custody, and thus made the jury verdict
binding on the court, whereas previously the jury verdict was advisory.
It has always been the custom and practice, however, for a trial court
to fix-Wisitation rights as between parents, without the intervention of
a jury. There does not appear to be any Texas case law on the right
of trial by jury on the child visitation issue. It is true that in Green
v. Green52 the trial court did submit the visitation issue to the jury
over the objection of the mother.5
Green was decided on another
48. 177 P.2d 628 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
49. Id. at 629.
50. Tex. Laws 1961, ch. 305, § 1, at 663.
51. Tex. Laws 1961, ch. 305, § 1, at 663-64 (emphasis added).
52. 485 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
53. Record, Green v. Green, 485 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
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question of law, however, making it unnecessary for the court of civil
appeals to write on this question.
The language of Section 11.13(b) of the Family Code, with respect
to the jury verdict being binding on the court on the issue of access
to a child, is somewhat ambiguous. Leaving out the words of "managing conservatorship, possession, and support of," and reading the statute solely from the point of view of access or visitation of a child,
the language is as follows:
The verdict of a jury is binding on the court except with respect
to the issues of . . . access to a child, on which the verdict is advisory only, provided however, the court may not enter a decree
that contravenes the verdict of a jury on the issues of . . access
to a child."'
The statute first provides for the jury verdict on access to be only advisory. The statute subsequently states that the court may not enter a
decree that contravenes the verdict of the jury on the issue of access
to a child. If the jury verdict is advisory only, the court is entitled
as a matter of law to disregard the jury verdict and render judgment.
If on the other hand, the court may not enter a decree which contravenes the jury verdict, then the jury verdict is not merely advisory but
is in fact binding on the court. Obviously these clauses of the statute
are in conflict with each other. Perhaps it could be argued that the
statute is correctly interpreted to mean that the jury verdict is advisory
only to the court on the issue of access to a child; however, until
the courts have dealt with this issue, the answer will remain unsettled.
One further aspect of the operation of these new statutes deserves
mention. This grant of grandchild visitation rights is not limited to
a divorce proceeding and could conceivably apply when the father,
mother and child live together as a family or when the surviving parent
and child live together as a family.
.

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Under the new statute, visitation rights with the grandchild could
presumably be granted to both sets of grandparents. Assuming that
in a divorce proceeding the custody of a child were awarded to the
mother and that the father were given reasonable visitation rights, then
this would then make a total of six people who would have access
to the child: The mother with custody of the child, the father and
54. TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 11.13(b) (Supp. 1974).
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four grandparents, all of whom would have judicially enforceable visitation rights with the minor child.
This type of an arrangement might well deprive the father of the
full visitation rights to which he is entitled by forcing him to share
visitation with the grandparents. It can also be argued that the father
and each of the four grandparents are entitled to have a jury pass
on the issue of the extent of visitation to which each is entitled. In
a contested hearing, the entry of a decree giving "reasonable visitation
rights" would probably not be satisfactory to the parties and it would
be necessary for the decree to state visitation rights with great particularity. Under the new statute the father and each of the four grandparents may also be entitled, as a matter of law, to have the jury specify,
in answers to special issues, those particular visitation rights which are
considered reasonable and supposedly in the best interest and welfare
of the child. The effect of all of these required jury findings as to
visitation rights would greatly complicate any action they were attendant to and court orders granting visitation rights could be quite detrimental to the mother's exercise of her authority over the child as the
custodial parent.
The statute further authorizes the court to issue any necessary orders
to enforce its decree. Presumably then, upon motion of a grandparent,
the court could enter an order directing that the mother not change
her residence or remove the child from the jurisdiction of the court.
This question is not as frivolous as one might think. There have been
instances in Texas where a court, incident to a divorce proceeding, has
awarded custody of the children to one spouse and has enjoined such
spouse from removing the child from a certain county. 5 Allowing
visitation rights to four grandparents increases the possibility of similar
orders in the future.
There will also be problems of jury submission. Counsel for the
grandparent will probably want to submit a special issue in substance
as follows:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that it would
be in the best interests and welfare of the minor child for the
grandparent to have reasonable visitation privileges with such
child?
The gravamen of this type.of jury submission, from the standpoint of
55. E.g., Ex parte Rhodes, 163 Tex. 31, 352 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Sup. 1962); Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 483 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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counsel for the custodial parent, is that the jury is not necessarily required to find that the best interest and welfare of the child demands
such visitation with the grandparent. This jury submission does not
necessarily require a showing of any special need for the child to visit
with the grandparent.
The necessity of determining visitation rights in light of the above
factors is best shown in a hypothetical fact situation. Assume that
the child is 6 years old, and a normal, healthy, happy and well-provided for child, receiving proper parental guidance, love and affection
from the mother, the father being deceased. Assume further that one
of the grandparents has not seen such child for the past 5 years, that
the child does not really know such grandparent. In this context add
the factors that hostile and bitter relations exist as between this particular grandparent and the mother of the child, arising out of purely
personal matters; that such grandparent is a fit person; that the mother
is a fit person; and, that nevertheless irreconcilable differences and conflicts exist between such grandparent and the mother. How would the
jury react when this particular grandparent appeared before the jury
in tears, telling of his great love and affection for this grandchild that
he has not been allowed to see, and if reasonable visitation privileges
were granted to him, that he would not do anything to cause the child
any emotional or physical harm? How would the jury then deal with
the mother's testimony to the effect that she fears that such grandparent, if visitation is granted, will attempt to destroy the love and
affection of the child for her, and attempt to convince the child that
her mother is an unworthy person, and in any event will unsettle the
respect which the child has for the mother? With further testimony
from various witnesses as to such grandparent being a fine and reputable person, deeply concerned about the welfare of the grandchild, the
jury may well be hard-pressed to believe the fears of the mother. The
jury could even be convinced that the mother's denial of visitation privileges to such grandparent is harsh, in fact cruel. The probability
would be great that the jury would find that the best interest and welfare of the minor child would be served for such grandparent to have
reasonable visitation privileges.
An analysis and review of the record in this assumed fact situation
shows that the grandparent will have prevailed solely because of the
sentiment attached to a grandparent-grandchild relationship and the basic
proposition that generally it is good for a grandparent to have visitation
privileges with the grandchild. In this assumed situation there is no
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evidence showing that the welfare of the child requires visitation with
such grandparentand there is no showing that there is any special need
by the child to visit with the grandparent. In substance the jury has
answered this special issue on the basis of their belief that this grandparent is fit and has not been proven to be unworthy by the mother.
The jury may not realize that many of the mother's fears for her child,
if visitation is permitted, are not susceptible of that type of proof required in a jury trial. The record in this hypothetical case and the
findings thereon shows only that the grandparent is thought to have
a need of visitation with the grandchild. The controlling factor should
be the needs of the grandchild, not the needs of the grandparent. The
jury has completely overlooked the fact that the child will probably
be thrown into the hostile environment existing between the mother
and grandparent as a result of this coerced visitation by the grandparent. Such circumstances may result in a substantial danger of emotional harm to the child.
If these new concepts are in fact to become the law in Texas, then
perhaps a more objective jury submission would be made possible by
the following special issue;
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the welfare, contentment, peace of mind and happiness of the child make
it essential for the child to have visitations with the grandparent?
Perhaps this form of special issue would focus the attention of the jury
more on the needs of the child as distinguished from the needs of the
grandparent.
BEST INTEREST AND WELFARE OF THE CHILD

Both the Family Code and case law are vitally concerned with the
best interest and welfare of the child as being the primary consideration." The basic difference between the two however is in the method
used in determining the best interest and welfare of the child.
In substance the Family Code dictates that whenever there is a conflict between a fit custodial parent and a grandparent over visitation
with the grandchild, the conflict should be resolved by the court, with
or without the intervention of a jury. In this way the Family Code
purports to determine the best interest and welfare of the child. There
56. TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 14.07 (Supp. 1974); Legate v. Legate, 87 Tex. 248,
28 S.W. 281 (1894); Johnson v. Campbell, 107 S.W.2d 1111, 1112 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1937, no writ).
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does not seem to be any case law, however, to support this theory of
the Family Code as to the determination of grandparent visitation
rights. There are any number of Texas cases which point to the controlling effect given to the best interest and welfare of the child, but
these concern parent's visitation rights."7 The case law of Texas and
other jurisdictions of the United States has resolved that the court
should not take the position of an arbitrator as between a fit custodial
parent and a grandparent on the issue of grandchild visitation. The
best interest and welfare of the child have been found to be served
by entrusting such child to the fit custodial parent, and not infringing
upon the right of such parent to direct the upbringing of his child by
requiring grandparent-grandchild visitation over -the protest of the parent.
CONCLUSION

It is not sound in principle or in practice for a grandparent to have
visitation rights with a minor grandchild over the protest of a fit custodial parent. If a grandparent is to have these so-called "rights," what
about an aunt or an uncle? A New York trial court, confronted
with this situation, gave visitation rights to a maternal grandmother,
a maternal aunt and uncle over the objection of a father having child
custody, although on appeal the trial court was reversed as to all visitation orders. 58
The case law of Texas and the case law throughout the United
States, acting to preserve the best interests of the child, has upheld
the right of a fit custodial parent to direct the upbringing of his child,
without interference from a grandparent. Case law prohibits any court
ordered visitations by the grandparent over the protest of the custodial
parent. There is no sound basis in law or equity for the change provided in the Family Code of granting such visitation rights to a grandparent. Looking to the future, if present Texas case law is not followed, there will be no end of difficulties for children and the courts.
57. Herrera v. 'Herrera, 409 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tex. Sup. 1966); Taylor v. Meek,

154 Tex. 305, 276 S.W.2d 787 (1955); Johnson v. Campbell, 107 S.W.2d 1111, 1112

(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1937, no writ).

58. People ex rel. Marks v. Grenier, 293 N.Y.S. 364, 365 (Sup. Ct. 1937) where
reference is made to an order of the trial court in People ex rel. Schacter v. Kahn,

269 N.Y.S. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
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